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This article discusses criticisms made by Fichte and Hegel of the Enlightment, and how simi-
larities between these criticisms reveal an essential thought in German Idealism. Both, like 
Kant, considered that history is the development of the individual and especially of collective 
freedom. This takes place according to a dialectical process. Fichte placed the Enlightenment 
in the third period of history, a time when the individual became aware of his freedom but was 
detached from all external authority, an authority that had predominated during the preced-
ing second period and struggled against it. Therefore, by considering only the individual as 
free, he did not address the community or even the divine root that makes it possible. Losing 
sight of this essence and becoming individually self-centred, he made a rational and cosmo-
politan community and true freedom impossible. Hegel believed enlightened reason had also 
lost sight of the unitary and community essence of the Spirit and its actions. The reason for 
this is that human beings lived in an alienated social and political world dominated by the 
Lord of the world and not by reason. The enlightened individual subsequently went on to con-
quer social reality through cultural hegemony. However, he thought that he could build it only 
from himself, without considering the community essence of the Spirit, which he left to the 
field of religious faith and despised as superstition. This unilateral vision leads to the period of 
terror. In our globalized world, there is a greater need to achieve that community essence in 
our way of being human. 
Keywords: Fichte, Hegel, Enlightenment, freedom, individual, community. 
Introduction: History as the sphere of realization of freedom
Fichte divides the process of history into five periods corresponding to his method of 
fivefoldness (Fünffachheit), with the Enlightenment occupying the third place. For Fichte, 
history is not a mere accumulation of facta or facts, nor does it run in a straight line — 
from a golden age downwards or from barbarism upwards — nor spirally according to the 
evolution of an organic body as in Herder, nor by “corsi e ricorsi”, as Vico thought. Instead, 
history unfolds dialectically, with a necessary moment of negativity, dissolution of ele-
ments and opposition, so that various elements of the first unity emerge in their full power 
and effects. More precisely, the negativity of the Enlightenment, which Fichte described 
dramatically as the epoch of sinfulness, makes possible the necessary transition from an 
individual freedom limited by external authority of the second epoch of history, to a self-
formed but rational freedom of the two last epochs, in which the human being sees and 
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experiences the common root of his freedom, a root that arises from the revelation or 
manifestation of God or the Absolute Being (das absolute Sein).
Indeed, according to Fichte, the theme of history is the establishment of the free le-
gal and political conditions in a State and between all States. For Kant and Hegel as well, 
history is the realization of rational freedom in human relationships and the effective rec-
ognition, through laws and institutions, of the freedom of all human beings. In Kant, phi-
losophy is supposed to discover the end, and the argument, of the interaction of rational 
individuals with each other in order to find meaning in it; the basis of this argument is that 
“the unsocial sociability” [1, p. 20] will compel the human being to “achieve a generally 
civil law-governing society” [1, p. 22]. However, it remains unclear whether this purpose 
will be achieved because, as he explains in his Critique of Judgement, this idea has only a 
regulative, hermeneutical, and non-constitutive validity.
For Hegel, this realization of freedom is more certain, since it is guided by the Spirit 
of the world and the cunning of reason. When the subjective Spirit understands that hap-
piness will not fully satisfy him, but that freedom is his essence, and also that this freedom 
can only be realized through the recognition of the freedom of all individuals, he turns 
to the sphere of the objective Spirit. There he makes it his mission to objectify and realize 
this recognition of all people as free beings through the laws, institutions and States. It is 
only within a State that contracts and morality, families and civil society are possible and 
secure. But who regulates the relationships between States? It is no longer the human be-
ing and his objective Spirit, but the World-Spirit itself through them, and even through 
their passions, a Spirit that is the first stage or manifestation of the Absolute Spirit. This 
universal Spirit is embodied in a nation and its State at all times, in the nation that would 
be more advanced in terms of the realization of freedom and reason at this time. This 
progression creates the sense and direction of history, and it is the task of the philosopher 
to recognize and clarify it.
Fichte gives the philosopher the same role, namely to show how the realization of 
freedom among people in a community takes place, and what stage it is at, or which stage 
it is experiencing. The human being, as a finite, rational creature, leads fundamentally 
a community existence, and “becomes a human only among men” [2, p. 347]. He does 
this by recognizing each individual as a free being, by asking them to behave freely and 
actively, to treat others equally, and by the education of each individual by another, and 
for each other — and to that end, achieving all this through laws, institutions, and the 
establishment of a rational State. The ground for this freedom lies even deeper in the 
second Fichte, at the time when he wrote The Characteristics of the Present Age and Ad-
dresses to the German Nation: it is not just the freedom of human beings or the pure I, but 
the free life of the manifestation of the Absolute Being, on which that human freedom 
is founded, since this rational freedom is an appearance and realization of this life. The 
Absolute Being or God is by itself, of itself, and from itself (durch sich, von sich und aus 
sich), and for Fichte that means it is alive and not dead, it is not a thing or a product of 
anything else. Therefore, his appearance or manifestation, the absolute knowledge (ab-
solutes Wissen), should also be a free life in order to be a true revelation of the Absolute 
Being. Although it emerged from the Absolute as an image and not out of itself, it should 
show and develop its own free image-life from itself, of which the world and the human 
beings are moments. We live this life of Appearance, we are self-images of this forming 
life [3, p. 296–297].
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But this is actually a task that guides the whole development of the manifestation or 
appearance of God (Erscheinung Gottes), and it is an obligation that appears in human be-
ings and their history as legality, morality, religion, and science: the absolute Being should 
manifest itself as a reality and be recognized as such — something that can happen only 
in humanity. Therefore, every human being and every human society should act by itself, 
of itself, and from itself, that is, it should be free, since it is only then that they are truly 
suitable and accurate immanent appearances of the life which externalizes and reveals the 
Absolute Being. “Freedom should appear in the totality of consciousness of the [human] 
species, and enter into it as its own freedom, as true actual deed, and as the product of 
the species in its life, and forthcoming from its life” [3, p. 198]. Here we do not speak of 
arbitrary but of rational freedom. However, this end cannot be achieved in one fell swoop, 
either in individuals or even in a single society, because consciousness and knowledge — 
the whole appearance of absolute Being is knowledge, absolute knowledge — need bound-
aries and distinctions, different elements and perspectives in order to recognize itself. The 
process of building community freedom is history.
Because reason is universal, “the first basic feature of the world-plan [in the history], 
the general dissemination of culture, is gradually promoted; and according to the same 
rule, it will go on incessantly until the whole [human] species, which inhabits our sphere, 
has melted into a single people-republic of culture” [3, p. 323]. Until then, everyone should 
act as a patriot in order to lead his nation to freedom and rational conditions, but always 
in relation to, and directed towards, the cosmopolitan purpose: “Cosmopolitanism is the 
ruling and dominant will that the end of the human race is attained in the human race. 
Patriotism is the will that this end is achieved first and foremost in the nation of which we 
are members, and that from which success spreads throughout the whole [human] race. 
…that, in reality, cosmopolitanism would necessarily become patriotism. <…> And so 
every cosmopolitan becomes absolutely necessary, by virtue of his limitation by the na-
tion, patriot” [4, p. 399–400]. It is in this sense that Fichte’s Addresses to the German Na-
tion has to be understood. History, too, moves within this cosmopolitan framework. It is 
necessarily a universal history of humanity, because “nothing individual can live in and of 
itself, but everything lives in the whole” [3, p. 241].
Fichte: The Enlightenment as the third epoch
“The end of the earthly life of mankind is to establish in it all its relations with free-
dom according to reason; whereby this life falls into five main epochs” [3, p. 193]. This 
division into five epochs shows that an a priori idea, as a last criterion, orders, evaluates, 
and interprets historical events, and it is only thanks to this fact that this interpretation is 
philosophical: “The history of this gradual cultivation of the human race, as actual history, 
has in turn two intimately intertwined components: one a priori and other a posteriori” [3, 
p. 304]. As a result, the philosopher strives to understand the inner meaning and spiritual 
sense of world events. This a priori part of history is the plan of the world, just as it will be 
in Hegel, but there is also an a posteriori part in history: “Now this development of the hu-
man race does not occur in general, as the philosopher describes it in a single survey: but 
it gradually comes, disturbed by forces alien to it, at certain times, in certain places, under 
certain special circumstances. All these special environments do not in any way emerge 
from the a priori conception of that world-plan; they are that which is un-conceptualized 
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in him, and, since it is the only concept for it, that which is not at all conceptualized; and 
here enters the pure empiric of history, its a posteriori, the actual history in its form” [3, 
p. 304] — insofar as history is “a part of science in general; namely, in addition to phys-
ics, the second part of empiricism” [3, p. 295]. Furthermore, these epochs, as in Hegel, are 
valid for nations that are at the forefront of the culture of their times, and even then, not 
to all the individuals within those nations 
Here we limit ourselves to the a priori world-plan of history. The life of humans “goes 
forward according to a fixed plan, which must necessarily be reached, and therefore is sure 
reached. This plan is this: that the species develops itself in this life with freedom into the 
pure impression (Abdruck) of reason” [3, p. 206]. In the first two epochs, reason becomes 
active, and it is gradually discovered and raised to consciousness. These early effects of 
reason will run rather blindly, without insight into the grounds that is, through feeling or 
instinct. But they serve to ensure that rational freedom consciously reflects on itself and 
gradually it gains a clear idea of itself. In the last two stages, reason, free from instinct and 
already known, can organize the human world and human relationships through freedom 
and through people, who become aware of it, since reason and rational freedom can only 
work through the clear consciousness of humans. This explanation of man’s vocation is 
made by the higher morality, a morality that is not merely formal like the Kantian one, 
by religion (above all by Johannine Christianity) and by philosophy, first by Kantian phi-
losophy, and finally by Fichte’s Science of Knowledge, which assumes that the real is a free 
life and not a dead thing. The third epoch is called Enlightenment, which is a transition 
between the two first and the two last periods of history.
In the first epoch of human history, the newly arisen reason is not recognized as 
such, and the human being was not reflexively aware of it. Therefore, it seemed like a 
dark instinct, a blind feeling, but in no way a freedom. Fichte describes this period as the 
“state of the innocence of the human race” [3, p. 201]. Mythically, it would be the earthly 
paradise or the golden age, however Fichte speaks about the necessary assumption of an 
original normal people without science, art and history [3, p. 299–300]. In the second part 
of history, humanity begins to lose this innocence or the lack of a reflective consciousness 
of reason, and to become increasingly aware of its freedom. This happens especially in 
powerful people, more strongly possessed by this rational instinct, who rise above others 
as a compelling authority over their community. The universal validity of reason, which 
in the first epoch was an internal instinct, appears, therefore, in the second as external 
compulsion that gives the subordinates a feeling of their own freedom. Consequently, this 
awakening of the freedom of all causes the third stage of human history. 
In this third epoch, the time of the Enlightenment, reason struggles against every ex-
ternal authority and force, that is, against every externality of freedom, because it under-
stands that the free and rational human being should act out of himself, through himself 
and on his own initiative. In this sense, this view is closer to the true life of the phenom-
enon, which creates and develops its life as image (the world) by itself, of itself and from it-
self. Individuals liberated themselves from reason as the instinct of earlier stages and from 
any external authoritarian power that sought to determine what should be thought, done 
or felt. “Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own mind! Thus, that’s the motto of the 
Enlightenment”, Kant wrote [5, p. 35]. Individuals understand that any external authority 
that cannot be justified by one’s own reason is irrational and tyranny. The principle of the 
third age is therefore liberation, the condition under which the species is only gradually 
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freed from all external authority, but by no means completely free. The tool for this libera-
tion is the concept — the opposite of blind instinct, faith, and obedience. The basic maxim 
of the age is thus: “nothing as being [reality] and as binding [duty] to be accepted, as that 
which one understands and clearly conceptualize” [3, p. 209]. This new freedom of each 
individual to speak and act facilitates science and the growing consciousness of reason, 
as it does the emergence of science itself. This third epoch of history is, for Fichte, already 
his own time, which lies between two worlds, between the world of darkness and external 
coercion, in which reason prevails at first directly through instinct and then indirectly 
as instinct through external authority on the one hand, and on the other, the world of 
clarity and freedom, where reason first through science, above all through the Science of 
Knowledge, and then through art, especially through Pestalozzi’s pedagogy, enters into the 
knowledge of men and into life, forming and organizing the whole human community [3, 
p. 206].
But what is the fundamental error of this historical period? What is the Fichte’s main 
criticism against Enlightenment? The accusation is that in it the individual is held as the 
radical and true reality, as the last instance, which loses sight of the fact the essence and 
unity of all human beings, from which individual freedoms spring. The universality or 
common life of reason was abolished because it showed the face of arbitrary external au-
thority, and the true root of freedom as the inner power of all, uniting all and giving the 
bond of life to all, was not yet discovered. Because the man of the Enlightenment was not 
yet aware of the universal life of reason and of the manifestation of absolute Being that 
the science of knowledge had discovered and explained, he put in the center of reality the 
life of the individual empirical subject as something that is independent from both, other 
people, and from the general life of the whole. That which is beyond his comprehension 
is nothing for him, only “that which he conceptualizes, which he understands himself im-
mediately with the already existing and without effort or work inherited healthy human 
understanding” [3, p. 243]. Therefore, the Enlightenment only considers as truly real the 
life of the individual, its drive to self-preservation and well-being, and what is useful to 
him: “In relation to ethics, it is recognized as the only virtue, that one may promote one’s 
own benefit… and for the only vice to miss his advantage… and that there is no other im-
pulse in human being than that of self-interest” [3, p. 216]. Yet this is precisely the origin of 
evil and egoism, and that is why Fichte describes this epoch as one of sinfulness, because 
everything that truly exists is only a moment in the One Living Reason. It is “the epoch of 
liberation directly from the commanding external authority, indirectly from the dominion 
of reason-instinct and from reason in general in every form: the age of absolute indiffer-
ence to all truth, and total untying (Ungebundenheit) without some guidance; the state of 
perfected sinfulness” [3, p. 207].
Although Fichte does not point this out, the thinking horizon of Enlightenment is 
similar to the first of five conceptions of reality or five worldviews, the five ways of being 
in the world and understand it: the sensible way. For Fichte the other four are higher: 
legality, higher morality, religion and philosophy. These views represent “the different pos-
sible stages and degrees of development of the inner spiritual life” [6, p. 105]. The lowest, 
the most superficial, worldview considers the sensible world to be the highest, the most 
truthful and existing for itself [6, p. 106]. This would not accurately reflect the attitude of 
the Enlightenment and it would show that there are not just five worldviews, but several 
more, as Hegel would demonstrate in his The Phenomenology of Spirit and a year later as 
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The Characteristics of the Present Age. For the Enlightenment, freedom, not the thing, is 
first and the highest, but a freedom that the human identifies with his empirical individu-
ality, and therefore he reifies it. It is equated with the interests of the empirical subject and 
therefore this attitude leads to similar goals and values as in the first worldview. For this 
reason, Fichte believes that empiricism prevails in the Enlightenment (as it does in the 
first worldview, because it is only through empirical experience that all that is useful for 
the empirical self-preservation and sensible well-being is recognized). But scepticism is 
also present around anything that wants to be beyond the body-world, like the objects of 
religion; “so also this [the religion] will turn to him into a mere happiness-doctrine” [3, 
p. 216]. The whole life is therefore reduced to the sensible personal existence and reality — 
as it is the case in the first worldview.
Fichte expressed such concern and criticism in Addresses to the German Nation. Since 
everyone during his time had only their own empirical interests in mind, in the manner 
of the German princes who made a deal with Napoleon, no one would do anything for 
the true freedom of Germany against the French occupation and oppression. Remaining 
in the third period of history only favored the invaders. The only solution and salvation 
for Germany that Fichte saw in this situation was the German people leaving this lowest 
worldview, overcoming the Enlightenment, and moving on to the fourth epoch of history. 
If that did not happen, the country would surrender to the French in anguish and fear of its 
empirical existence. It would do nothing for the advancement of freedom and free life, and 
it would transform itself into a people of the past and would no longer count for history 
because its spiritual reality and power would be destroyed. Thanks to Kantian philosophy 
and the Science of Knowledge, Germans could and should go, with total awareness, from 
the isolated empirical “I” of Enlightenment to the transcendental higher “We” of Idealism, 
which is rooted and grows in the communal divine and the free life of reason, and of the 
appearance of God, in order to live there freely and to act creatively, through a new culture 
that can and should bring the light and liberation to all mankind. But “Germans” were 
basically all those who understood and wanted to realize the good news of the Science of 
Knowledge, no matter where they were born or what language they spoke [7, p. 193–194].
The Hegel’s conception
A year after The Characteristics of the Present Age (1806), Hegel presented a similar 
conception of the Enlightenment in his Phenomenology of the Spirit (1807). This should 
be regarded as significant for the attitude of German idealism. The decisive factor here is 
not that this criticism of the Enlightenment is not quite justified, because the Enlighten-
ment also strongly emphasized the general validity of reason in the formation of the com-
munity, for example, by the idea of the universal human rights or in the social contract, 
but also in the Rousseau’s difference between volonté de tous (will of all side by side) and 
volonté générale (general will as the essential and rational unity of all), or even in the 
intensive cultivation of the objective sciences. What is highlighted here is a certain close-
ness between Fichte, especially the second Fichte, in his appearance of the Absolute and 
its life, and Hegel in his realization of the idea through the spirit, because both thought 
and demanded a more substantial unity of free human beings than what the Enlighten-
ment recognized. This should be considered in the face of a critique of modernity that is 
very common today, claiming that the subject of modern philosophy is an isolated being. 
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Nothing is further from the truth. For instance, Kant affirms the following: “Every genus 
of rational beings is determined objectively, in the idea of reason, for a common purpose, 
namely the promotion of the highest as a common good” [8, p. 97].
In the sixth chapter of the Phenomenology of the Spirit, called “The alienated Spirit. 
The culture” (or formation or education), Hegel interprets the historical development of 
the spirit from classical Greece to the German philosophy of his time. In paragraph B. II 
of this chapter, Hegel sets out his interpretation of the Enlightenment. The elements that 
come into play in dialectical tension are the universal essence or the ethical substance or 
be-in-itself (Ansichsein) of all spirits, and the self or self-consciousness of every individual. 
The first element, the ethical or political world, was dominated at first by the medieval feu-
dal lord and later by the modern absolute monarch. Accordingly, this ethical world, which 
in truth is the work of self-consciousness and reason and forms the essence of individuals, 
appears to the rational individual as something foreign that does not belong to him and 
that he cannot rationally configure; therefore, reason is in contradiction to itself. This ethi-
cal world, consisting of the power of the state and of wealth or family property, although it 
is the essence of the individual, is not determined by him (by most individuals), and this 
is why it appears to be estranged from it, as a blind fate. The originality, the rights and the 
freedom of the self-consciousness of individuals are not recognized because they cannot 
shape the ethical world. Rather, this world is left to the arbitrariness of an absolute ruler 
and it is not recognized in its rational nature. Accordingly, the alienated individual spirit 
cannot regard the ethical world as his essence. All that leads to the revolution.
Here it could be said that Hegel focuses on the French Enlightenment, which led to 
a political revolution and to the guillotining of the Lord of the world, while in Germany 
instead the Enlightenment led to an internal revolution in the way of thinking, in Kantian 
critical philosophy. “In Germany the Enlightenment was on the side of theology; in France 
he immediately took a direction against the Church” [9, p. 526]. Hegel thought this was so 
because, in Germany, the Lutheran Reformation had triumphed [9, p. 492 ff.] and that had 
introduced three important elements towards an internal revolution. The first was against 
the Catholic externality, which had turned the remission of sins and union with God into 
a mere matter of external rites and of the sale of indulgences, therefore, the inner character 
of the German people (Innigkeit des deutschen Volkes) reacted. Second, the Reformation 
rejected the external authority of the Catholic Church and its Pope and strengthened the 
freedom of the individual and his direct relationship to God, and to his revelation without 
intermediaries. “That is the essential content of the Reformation: man is determined by 
himself to be free” [9, p. 497]. Third, the Reformation reconciled religion with the order of 
the mundane: it sanctified marriage against the chastity of monks, it abolished fasting and 
abstinence, it blessed money, work, industry, and commerce against poverty and mendi-
cant orders: “through the Protestant church took place the reconciliation (Versöhnung) 
of religion with right. There is no religious and holy conscience separate and opposed to 
worldly right” [9, p. 539]. In addition, the Reformation did not separate itself from science, 
philosophy, and humanist literature.
From the previous chapter, chapter V, B: “The realization of rational self-conscious-
ness by itself ”, the process of formation of the spirit enters “the realm of ethics” (das Reich 
der Sittlichkeit), the sphere of acting or practice reason, which actively configures its ob-
jectivity in the world because it knows that without it, it lacks truth, it lacks reality. That 
is “the beginning of its ethical experience of the world” [10, p. 268], first throughout that 
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chapter V, as individuals, and then in chapter VI as historical communities succeeding 
one another, “for ethicity is nothing other than the absolute spiritual unity of the essence 
of individuals in the autonomous reality of those individuals” [10, p. 264], the unity of 
individual and community. Individuals should remain autonomous among themselves, 
conscious of their free individuality (that is their certainty), and yet essential or substan-
tially united in a real community, where their truth is realized: “Reason is Spirit when 
the certainty of being all reality rises to the truth” [10, p. 324]. Individuals are essentially 
united in the objectified spirit, “in the life of a people” [10, p. 264], in their customs, in 
their laws, in their institutions, in their culture, in their work, which make them interde-
pendent. That historically objectified reason is the ground and substance of individuals; 
in it they carry out their actions and their ends, they become rational beings. “The Spirit 
is the ethical life of a people” [10, p. 326], the ethos of a historical community. Fichte had 
said: “The human being only among human beings becomes a human being” [2, p. 347]. 
Therefore, the human being is essentially a social and community being, because it is only 
through a human relationship, through language and concepts, that is, through education, 
that he reaches his rationality.
Hegel opened this chapter VI, which was dedicated to the Spirit, with Greece, where 
the immediate unity of individuals and polis would have occurred, with predominance of 
the community over the individuals. Then, in a second stage, the dissolution of that unit 
begins, already with the Roman Empire, and individuals leave the “maternal womb” of 
the Spirit of the people, affirming their free and rational individuality. This dissolution of 
the first unity is for Hegel a necessary process, the second stage of a dialectical process, 
since the elements included in that primary and naive unity have to come to light, to be 
deployed, to be known and recognized as such in all its potentiality and limits: there is 
profit, real conflict is necessary, because consciousness requires distinction, opposition. 
Therefore, in the third stage, the Spirit is forced to return to itself, first to its moral con-
science, which would happen in the philosophy of Kant, and finally to a reconciliation and 
mutual forgiveness, a threshold towards religion, the utopia that Hegel proposes in his 
Phenomenology of the Spirit — a utopia, because it did not occur in reality.
Since free individuality was not recognized in the Middle Ages or in early Modernity 
and at that time the individual had certainty to be free, albeit not truth and reality, the af-
firmation of the free individual that takes place during the Enlightenment was achieved 
by separating it from the essential unity of individuals in the community, staying away 
from its truth; that is the central idea. The being-for-itself (Fürsichsein) or consciousness 
has come out of the life of the ethical substance, of its being-in-itself (Ansichsein), of its 
truth, so that the Spirit appears as the autonomous reality of individual consciousness as 
certainty. The Spirit has the certainty of being the maker of the community, the one who 
builds it, but in fact as an individual it does not determine the reality of his community, 
and therefore that reality is alien to him, because it is dominated by the Lord of the world 
and his caprice, not by reason. The dialectic of the master and the servant is reproduced 
here at a historical level. But the recapture of reality or truth on the part of that Spirit, who 
is estranged from himself, will not be achieved through physical work, the stoic or scep-
tical denial of the reality of the world or by the withdrawal towards a unhappy religious 
consciousness, which was the reaction of the servant, but through the Bildung, through 
the intellectual formation or education, through culture, the own thing of the Spirit, the 
knowledge on himself, which is a process of elevation of the individual to the universal 
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and to essential thing (that is the education). It will be a culture capable of criticizing the 
irrationality of the status quo, the arbitrariness of the Lord of the world and of the state of 
society, capable of conquering, as Gramsci would say, the cultural hegemony that leads to 
a social and political revolution, to the real reconquest of the world, and also to possessing 
its truth and realization. We are now at the level of reason, and the rational spirit knows 
that it has to conquer the world to have truth, Wirklichkeit, reality. 
In the alienated world of the Spirit, which is the second stage, the stage of dispersion 
of the elements, there are two dialectical processes between the Lord and the servants. 
The first is the double attitude that the servants can take before the lord of the world: that 
of the noble conscience and that of the vile conscience. It may happen that (1) the self-
consciousness or individual accepts his ethical and historical world and identifies with 
it, with both, the power of the feudal Lord or absolute Monarch and the so distributed 
wealth, and the individual qualifies them as good and universally valid. Thus arises the 
noble conscience, the vassal faithful to the Lord of the world. Or that (2) the individual 
realizes the contradiction, considers the political situation as bad, that the absolute power 
of the Monarch nullifies its being-for-itself, and that wealth insulates individuals, and then 
he becomes a vile and treacherous conscience. The dialectic of Hegel is aimed at showing 
the relativity and inversion of both perspectives, their essential respectivity, since they are 
two sides of the same coin: the non-recognition of the rational individual in the configu-
ration of the ethical and political world and that this world is governed not by reason and 
rational freedom, but by the arbitrariness of the Lord of the world. Insofar as the noble 
conscience does not renounce its being for itself, it will always be able to rise up: the no-
bles against the Monarch. The vile conscience, on the other hand, when recognizing the 
contradiction is more true and sincere, preserves its freedom of criticism, and is the one 
that will carry forward the dialectical process, which will lead to the following dialectical 
opposition: that of the Enlightenment.
The real alienation of the servants in front of the Lord of the world leads to another 
alienation in the ideal sphere of the understanding of reality. The real dialectic is followed 
here by a dialectic between faith and the illustrated reason, or pure insight, or Enlight-
enment, two interpretations of reality that confront each other over which one should 
be estimated as true, valid and binding. One is the religious faith that seeks to grasp the 
substance and the universal nature of human beings. But this faith does not think about 
the ethical substance using the (dialectical and speculative) concept — that is, not with the 
appropriate means, and therefore places it in God as a substance separate from self-con-
sciousness. Thus, self-consciousness remains estranged from its content as it is estranged 
from its ethical real world. 
The other worldview arises from self-consciousness itself. The ethical world belongs 
to the Lord; therefore, the enlightened self-consciousness has withdrawn within itself and, 
from there, it tries to gain a clear insight into the world purely from itself. In this pro-
cess, its formation (Bildung), its culture and the cultivation of itself, such as the behaviour 
of the servant in front of the Lord, are carried out, but this time not through physical 
but through spiritual work. This mode of understanding invokes the concept, the reason, 
the pure intellection (die reine Einsicht) of self-consciousness: one must think for oneself, 
“sapere aude” (Kant). In this way, the spirit, as a rational self-consciousness, recovers its 
autonomy, its originality in the face of all the tutelage of the Lord of the world and of all 
authority, as well as that of the given faith. From there, from that thinking, he performs 
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his own formation (Bildung) or education, ascends to the universal of reason, criticizes the 
state of the world and presents a program of liberation. That is the guiding principle of the 
modern age, which Hegel believes to be superior to Greek unity, specifically, the principle 
of the autonomy of individuality, subjective freedom and its right to self-determination, 
where everyone is recognized as free; the supreme right of the subject is not to be forced 
to consider as good and just that which contradicts his rational moral convictions. That 
freedom of the individual is born, according to Hegel, with Christianity: the freedom of 
the children of God, strengthened against the Church in the Reformation and established 
as a norm before all authority in the Enlightenment and Kantian philosophy. That is the 
great achievement of Kant’s moral philosophy, “to emphasize the pure and unconditioned 
self-determination of the will as the root of duty” [11, p. 252].
It can be concluded that, through cultural hegemony, the enlightener wants to con-
quer the world, or at least the ethical and political world. Yet in this activity of thought, 
self-consciousness does not start from the essence or content of the objective spirit, from 
his being-in-itself (An-sich-sein), because that has remained on the side of faith. Instead, it 
starts from his mere certainty lacking in historical truth — that is, he starts from the mere 
being-for-itself (Fürsichsein) or self-consciousness of individuals, so that the criterion is to 
accept nothing but what every rational being can achieve and understands on its own. The 
pure insight of self-consciousness “conceives nothing but the self and everything as the 
self, that is, he conceptualizes everything, erases all objectivity, and transforms all being-
in-itself into being-for-itself ” [10, p. 361]. He behaves as if the ethical world had started 
with him. In that lies its one-sidedness. The Enlightenment has recognized the rights of 
self-consciousness, of the rational individual, but it has detached it from its essence, from 
its ethical substance, it does not conceive it as arising from it and the free and rational 
individuals appear in an isolated way; Fichte and Hegel coincide in this essential point 
of criticism to the Enlightenment. “The Enlightenment has eliminated and erased every-
thing that is speculative about human and divine things” [9, p. 524] and this content or 
essence has been handed over to the faith [9, 526]. It is therefore an abstract and finite rea-
son, which is only addressed by the formal principles of identity and by not contradiction.
For Hegel, the two forms of this spirit, faith and pure insight, are both sides of an 
alienated world that appear separate because of their one-sidedness — certainty and truth 
(essence, content) — which is why both interpretations or perspectives are unilateral and 
do not properly comprehend the real. Faith assumes that all ethical content is given, and 
the enlightener claims that the content is created by the self-consciousness of individu-
als. The rights of being-for-itself and self-consciousness, that is, the rights that the free 
and rational man, has to understand all content of morality from reason are not grasped 
by faith. The Enlightenment, on the other hand, erroneously believes that its conscious 
individuality is elevated above all objective moral content and over every other instance. 
Self-consciousness puts itself in the center of reality and therefore considers everything 
else useful for itself and its individual freedom. For this reason, both philosophers, Fichte 
and Hegel, assume that the Enlightenment reduces the essence to the individually useful.
According to Hegel, this view of enlightened consciousness, which separates itself 
from its essential content in its freedom and thus remains empty, leads to the French 
Revolution, in which the self-consciousness of individuals wants to create the entire ethi-
cal world from themselves and from zero, as if reason had hitherto been without power, 
and man should not really have to depend and rely on what was produced and formed by 
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reason in society. What is actually achieved with this arbitrariness, however, is the trig-
gering of a period of terror in which all those who are deemed to be opponents or useless 
were killed. For Hegel this is “the fury of destroying” [11, p. 50].
The solution lies in the synthesis of both views, in the inner free and rational insight 
of the individual through the (philosophical) education and the conviction that the uni-
versal substance or objective spirit according to Hegel, or the absolute appearance of the 
absolute Being according to Fichte, or the free and just intersubjectivity in actual terms, 
represents its most intimate essence, takes charge of it and work for it. Only there is one’s 
own freedom recognized and confirmed, the modern principle behind which we should 
not fall [12, p. 367]. We live in a globalized world, are ever more closely connected, and the 
need for a substantial communal and cosmopolitan bond to connect us all becomes all the 
stronger in order to become human, to live in peace and justice, and to be truly liberated. 
This bond should be sought and found in the essence of freedom, since it is not merely an 
individual matter, but it is rather an essentially interpersonal thing, and it should also be 
founded, empirically and materially, in the necessary participation of all to keep us alive 
in a habitable planet.
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В статье рассматривается критика Просвещения Фихте и Гегелем, а также близость их 
критических подходов, в чем проявляется существенное содержание немецкого иде-
ализма. Оба они, как и Кант, считали, что история — это развитие личности и, пре-
жде всего, коллективной свободы. Это развитие происходит в соответствии с диалек-
тическим процессом. Фихте поместил Просвещение в третий период истории, когда 
человек осознает свою свободу, но остается оторванным от всякой внешней власти, 
которая доминировала в  течение предыдущего периода истории и  боролась против 
личной свободы. Поэтому, рассматривая свободу лишь на уровне индивида, человек 
упускает ее общественное основание или даже ее божественный корень, теряет из виду 
ее сущность и становится эгоцентричным, делая таким образом рациональное и кос-
мополитическое сообщество и истинную свободу невозможными. Гегель считал, что 
просвещенный разум также потерял из виду унитарную и общинную сущность Духа 
и его действия. Причина этого заключается в том, что люди жили в отчужденном соци-
альном и политическом мире, где царствовал Господь мира, а не разум. Впоследствии 
просвещенный человек завоевал социальную реальность посредством культурной 
гегемонии. Однако он полагал, что может построить ее лишь из  себя как индивида, 
упуская при этом общинную сущность Духа, оставленную им религиозной вере, пре-
зираемой как суеверие. Это одностороннее видение приводит к террору. В нашем гло-
бализованном мире достижение этой сущности сообщества необходимо, чтобы про-
должать оставаться людьми.
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